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Introduction	
	
As	of	this	writing	in	June	2016,	the	markets	are	predicting	that	Venezuela	is	on	the	brink	of	
defaulting	on	its	sovereign	debt.	On	June	1,	2016,	the	6	month	CDS	contract	traded	at	about	7,000	bps	
which	translates	into	a	likelihood	of	default	of	over	90%.		Our	particular	interest	in	the	Venezuelan	crisis	
is	that	its	outstanding	sovereign	bonds	have	a	unique	set	of	contractual	features	that,	in	combination	
with	its	near-default	status,	have	created	a	natural	experiment.		This	experiment	has	the	potential	to	
shed	light	on	one	of	the	long	standing	questions	that	sits	at	the	intersection	of	the	fields	of	law	and	
finance.	
	
The	question	is	the	degree	to	which	financial	markets	price	contract	terms.		Under	a	robust	
conception	of	the	efficient	markets	theory,	one	would	expect	all	relevant	public	information	to	get	
incorporated	into	the	price	of	a	financial	security.		And	that	would	certainly	include	information	as	to	
the	contract	terms	of	a	bond	that	are	key	to	determining	the	investor’s	payout	when	the	debtor	
defaults.		But	empirical	testing	of	the	question	of	how	efficient	the	sovereign	debt	markets	really	are	vis-
à-vis	contract	terms	has	proved	difficult	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	the	primary	one	being	that	data	is	
rarely	available	that	allows	a	clean	comparison	of	bonds	of	the	same	issuer	that	are	similar	in	all	other	
characteristics	except	for	a	particular	contract	term	(where	that	contract	term	has	a	meaningful	
likelihood	of	impacting	the	investor’s	payout).			
	
One	prominent	instance	that	created	a	natural	experiment	that	allowed	testing	of	the	above	
proposition	was	the	Greek	default	in	2012.		In	that	restructuring,	Greece	paid	different	types	of	bonds	
different	payouts	as	a	function	of	their	legal	terms;	most	prominently	their	governing	law	and	guarantee	
status.		And	researchers	have	found	evidence	that	the	markets	did	anticipate	the	prediction	that	the	
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foreign	law	governed	Greek	bonds	and	Greek	guarantee	bonds	had	a	higher	potential	payout	than	the	
generic	local	law	sovereign	bonds.1	
	
Governing	law	and	guarantee	status	though	are	highly	salient	contract	terms.	They	are	features	
that	are	obvious	to	investors	from	the	very	front	page	of	the	prospectus	or	offering	circular.		For	
example,	every	investor	presumably	knows	whether	he	holds	a	local-law	government	bond	or	a	foreign-
law	one.	One	just	has	to	look	at	the	length	of	the	sales	documents;	the	former	is	often	no	more	than	a	
page	or	two	whereas	the	latter	can	go	into	the	hundreds	of	pages	of	fine	print.		But	what	about	small	
differences	in	the	fine	print?	Are	the	markets	aware	of	these	smaller	differences	in	the	legalese	and	are	
they	able	to	price	securities	accordingly?		
	
In	the	sovereign	debt	literature,	there	has	been	much	debate	about	this	question	in	the	context	
of	one	contract	term	in	particular:	the	collective	action	clause	or	CAC.		The	reason	for	the	interest	in	the	
pricing	of	this	term,	which	started	roughly	in	1995	after	the	so-called	“Tequila	crisis”	in	Mexico,	is	that	
the	inclusion	of	this	particular	type	of	contract	term	has	been	advocated	on	multiple	occasions	by	a	
number	of	policy	makers	and	researchers	as	a	way	to	improve	the	international	financial	architecture.2		
At	the	time,	the	standard	contract	term	governing	modifications	for	foreign	sovereign	bonds	under	New	
York	law	required	unanimous	approval	of	the	creditors	for	any	changes	to	be	made	to	the	payment	
terms	of	the	bond	(e.g.,	principal,	interest,	maturity,	currency).		That	unanimity	requirement,	in	turn,	
meant	that	any	attempt	at	debt	restructuring	was	subject	to	a	significant	risk	of	holdouts.		And	that	risk	
of	the	holdouts	grabbing	a	disproportionate	share	of	the	pie	made	all	creditors	reluctant	to	enter	an	
exchange.		A	shift	to	a	lower	vote	threshold,	such	as	75%	of	the	creditors,	where	a	super	majority	could	
do	a	cram-down	of	dissenting	creditors--similar	to	what	most	domestic	bankruptcy	systems	allow--was	
more	sensible,	the	advocates	of	the	CACs	argued.			Some	of	them	explained	that	the	unanimity	provision	
in	New	York	law	bonds	was	the	product	of	mindless	copying	from	New	York	law	corporate	law	bond	
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documents.3	The	counter	argument,	made	by	opponents	of	the	CAC	reform	proposals,	was	that	the	
unanimity	requirement	was	the	product	of	rational	contracting;	and	was	a	way	for	debtors	to	commit	to	
creditors	not	to	engage	in	strategic	default.4	
	
To	cut	a	long	story	short,	the	theoretical	debate	remains	as	yet	unresolved.		As	a	practical	
matter	though,	the	advocates	of	CACs	won.		Starting	in	April	2003,	almost	every	single	New	York	law	
governed	sovereign	bond	has	moved	away	from	unanimity	provisions	towards	a	vote	requirement	of	
less	than	that	(usually	75%).5		What	interests	us	here	is	one	of	the	primary	rationales	that	was	given	for	
resolving	the	debate.	And	that	was	that	regardless	of	the	merits	of	the	theoretical	arguments	over	
whether	the	unanimity	provision	was	an	inefficient	historical	artifact	or	a	rational	attempt	to	use	
contracts	to	constrain	moral	hazard,	markets	didn’t	pay	attention	to	small	wording	differences	in	
contract	terms.6		Further,	the	argument	went,	if	markets	weren’t	going	to	price	the	difference	between	
a	unanimity	requirement	for	the	modification	of	key	terms	and	a	75%	CAC,	then	the	issuer	had	every	
incentive	to	include	the	CAC	in	its	bond	contracts.		
	
The	basis	for	the	foregoing	argument	was	a	series	of	papers	that	found	that	bonds	with	CACs	
and	bonds	without	CACs	did	not	seem	to	be	priced	very	differently.7		There	were	questions	that	could	be	
raised	about	these	initial	studies	though	in	that	they	were	usually	comparing	bonds	issued	under	English	
law	(that	tended	to	have	CACs)	versus	bonds	under	New	York	law	(that	tended	to	have	unanimity	
provisions).		But	English	and	New	York	law	vary	in	many	ways	and	the	contracts	written	under	them	also	
tend	to	vary	in	ways	well	beyond	a	single	provision.		Further,	the	countries	who	issued	in	one	jurisdiction	
tended	to	be	different	from	the	ones	issuing	in	the	other;	adding	to	the	apples	versus	oranges	character	
of	the	first	generation	of	CAC	pricing	studies.		Finally,	there	tend	to	be	a	plethora	of	non-legal	factors	
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impacting	bond	prices--liquidity,	geo-political	importance	of	the	sovereign,	likelihood	of	a	bailout	from	
the	IMF,	quality	of	local	political	institutions	and	so	on.		The	argument	can	always	be	made	therefore	
that	the	impact	of	contract	terms	on	price	is	too	difficult	to	discern	using	the	rough	tools	available	to	an	
econometrician	because	there	are	too	many	factors	to	control	for	and	not	enough	data.	
	
The	current	Venezuelan	crisis	though	has	potentially	given	us	a	natural	experiment	to	test	the	
foregoing	question,	albeit	in	a	limited	setting.		For	reasons	explained	below,	Venezuela	turns	out	to	have	
three	sets	of	bonds	with	different	modification	provisions–and	these	are	all	under	New	York	law	and	
largely	identical	in	all	other	respects	other	than	their	CACs.		Further,	Venezuela	is	in	deep	crisis;	as	of	this	
writing,	its	probability	of	default	within	the	next	six	months	is	north	of	90%.		This	is	important	because	
this	is	the	scenario	where,	in	theory,	legal	terms	should	be	most	important	to	market	participants.			And	
finally,	given	the	politics	of	its	current	government	and	the	general	oil	glut	there	is	a	very	low	
expectation	of	a	bailout	from	the	IMF,	any	other	Official	Sector	institution.8		Put	simply,	we	have	a	
country	with	multiple	bonds	under	the	same	law	(New	York)	that	have	small	differences	in	their	contract	
terms	that	should	matter	a	great	deal	to	the	likely	payouts	that	the	holders	of	these	bonds	will	receive	in	
the	event	of	a	default.9	
	
We	have	no	doubt	that	there	are	some	market	players	who	have	recognized	these	differences	in	
contract	terms;	there	have	been	multiple	articles	in	the	financial	press	noting	these	differences	in	legal	
terms	in	the	Venezuelan	sovereign	bonds.10		The	question	though	is	whether	this	recognition	of	the	
variation	in	contract	terms	has	become	widespread	enough	that	it	is	reflected	in	the	bond	prices.		
	
																																																						
8	The	wild	card	here	is	China,	that	has	provided	considerable	financial	support	to	the	Venezuelan	government	over	
the	past	decade.		Recent	reports	though	suggest	that	China	is	seeking	to	restructure	the	substantial	amounts	it	has	
already	lent	(upwards	of	$65	billion	since	2005),	rather	than	lend	new	money.		See	Lucy	Hornby	&	Andres	Schipani,	
China	Seeks	to	Renegotiate	Venezuela	Loans,	FINANCIAL	TIMES,	June	19,	2016.	
	
9	Any	doubts	about	whether	small	differences	in	contract	terms	can	make	an	enormous	difference	in	payouts	in	a	
sovereign	debt	restructuring	can	be	resolved	by	observing	what	happened	in	the	final	resolution	of	the	recent	
Argentine	and	Greek	debt	crises.		See,	e.g.,	Jeromin	Zettelmeyer,	Christoph	Trebesch	&	Mitu	Gulati,	The	Greek	
Restructuring	of	2012:	An	Autopsy,	28	ECON.	POL’Y	513	(2013);	Katia	Porzecanski,	Singer	Makes	369%	of	Principal	on	
Argentine	Bonds	in	Debt	Offer,	BLOOMBERG,	March	1,	2016.	
	
10	E.g.,	Robin	Wigglesworth	&	Elaine	Moore,	Sovereign	Debt:	Curing	Defaults,	FINANCIAL	TIMES,	June	7,	2016;	Andres	
Schipani	&	Elaine	Moore,	Fears	of	Venezuela	Debt	Default	Rise	as	Bond	Prices	Plunge,	FINANCIAL	TIMES,	January	22,	
2016;	Davide	Scigliuzzo,	Argentina-Style	Legal	Drama	Looms	if	Venezuela	Defaults	on	Debt,	REUTERS,	January	21,	
2016.	
Draft:	June	10,	2016	–	Forthcoming,	Capital	Markets	Law	Journal	(2016)	
The	Variation	in	the	Venezuelan	Bonds	
	
The	reason	for	there	being	small	differences	in	the	currently	outstanding	Venezuelan	bonds	has	
to	do	with	an	unusual	set	of	circumstances	surrounding	the	shift	to	CACs	in	the	New	York	market	in	2003	
and	2004.		As	noted	earlier,	there	was	considerable	uncertainty	at	the	time	as	to	how	the	markets	would	
react	to	the	change	in	contract	terms.		In	particular,	there	were	those	who	feared	that	the	markets	
would	react	negatively	to	sovereigns	making	it	easier	for	them	to	restructure	(that	is,	investors	would	
charge	a	higher	interest	rate	to	lend	to	these	sovereigns).		
	
Under	pressure	from	the	Official	Sector	institutions	such	as	the	IMF	and	the	US	Treasury	though	
a	number	of	emerging	market	sovereigns	finally	agreed	to	shift	to	CACs	in	early	2003.11		But	the	open	
question	was	what	the	vote	threshold	for	these	CACs	would	be.		A	drafting	committee	set	up	by	the	G-
10	group	of	countries	suggested	a	75%	vote	threshold,	but	others	were	advocating	higher	votes	
amounts	such	as	85%.		The	result	was	that	there	was	a	short	period	of	experimentation	and	competition	
where	one	group	of	countries,	led	by	Mexico	and	its	lawyers	(Cleary	Gottlieb),	pushed	for	the	75%	vote	
threshold	to	be	the	market	standard	and	another	group	and	led	by	Brazil	and	its	lawyers	(Arnold	&	
Porter),	tried	85%.12		The	market	did	not	seem	to	be	imposing	an	undue	penalty	on	the	75%	bonds	as	
compared	to	the	85%	ones	and	by	late	2004	the	New	York	law	market	had	coalesced	at	the	75%	mark.13	
	
Important	for	our	purposes	though	is	that	Venezuela	was	in	the	group	led	by	Brazil.	And	that	
means	that	we	have	outstanding	bonds	for	Venezuela	that	have	a	100%	vote	(the	pre	2003	bonds),	ones	
with	an	85%	vote	(2003	and	2004)	and	ones	with	a	75%	vote	(post	2004).		Other	things	equal	then,	the	
100%	bonds	are	going	to	be	easier	to	hold	out	on	than	the	85%	ones	which,	in	turn,	are	going	to	be	
easier	to	hold	out	on	from	than	the	75%	ones.		The	easier	it	is	to	hold	out,	as	the	recent	restructurings	of	
Greece	and	Argentina	have	illustrated,	the	higher	one’s	likely	payout	will	be.				
	
But	all	other	things	were	not	equal,	in	that	the	vote	threshold	was	not	all	that	changed	in	the	
bonds	in	2003-04.		Alongside	the	shift	away	from	the	100%	vote	to	the	85%	vote	in	the	Modification	
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provision,	that	the	external	world	was	focused	on,	the	Venezuelan	lawyers	also	made	a	tiny	change	in	a	
different	provision	of	their	bonds,	the	now	infamous	pari	passu	clause.14		After	the	enormous	recoveries	
obtained	by	holdout	creditors	against	Argentina	in	March	2016,	everyone	in	the	sovereign	debt	world	
knows	this	clause.15		After	all,	its	specific	wording	in	the	Argentine	bonds	was	the	basis	upon	which	the	
New	York	courts	granted	the	holdout	creditors	the	weapon	they	needed	to	bring	Argentina	to	its	
knees.16		But	back	in	2003,	the	clause	was	rather	obscure	to	all	but	obsessive	sovereign	debt	market	
watchers.		It	is	easiest	to	illustrate	the	change	by	pointing	to	the	actual	language	in	the	contracts,	which	
we	reproduce	below	in	relevant	part.	
	
The	pari	passu	clause	in	the	pre	2003	(100%	vote)	Venezuelan	bonds	said,	in	a	manner	very	
similar	to	most	other	sovereign	bonds	under	New	York	law	at	the	time:	
	
The	payment	obligations	of	[the	Republic]	under	under	the	[Notes]	will	at	all	times	rank	at	least	
equally	with	all	other	payment	obligations	of	Venezuela	relating	to	External	Public	Debt.17	
	
The	pari	passu	clause	in	the	2003	Venzuelan	bond	said,		
	
																																																						
14	We	do	not	know,	and	have	not	been	able	to	find	out,	whether	the	insertion	of	these	additional	words	was	the	
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15	For	discussions	of	the	enormous	payouts,	see	Porzecanski,	supra	note	9;	Matt	Levine,	Lucrative	Toes	and	
Animated	Bonds,	BLOOMBERG	VIEW,	March	2,	2016.	
	
16	The	Financial	Times	dubbed	the	case	“the	trial	of	the	century”	and	has	published	over	100	articles,	blog	posts	
and	podcasts	about	it.		See,	e.g.,	Joseph	Cotterill,	Back	to	Future	with	Pari	Passu,	FT	ALPHAVILLE,	Nov.	5,	2015,	
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The	payment	obligations	of	the	Republic	under	the	Notes	shall,	save	for	such	exceptions	as	may	
be	provided	by	applicable	legislation	.	.	.	[will]	at	all	times	rank	at	least	equally	with	all	its	other	
payment	obligations	relating	to	External	Public	Debt	.	.	.18	
	
We	see	above	that	the	November	2003	(85%)	bond	has	eleven	crucial	extra	words	in	its	pari	
passu	clause,	“save	for	such	exceptions	as	may	be	provided	by	applicable	legislation”	that	the	equivalent	
clause	in	the	July	1998	(100%)	bond	does	not	contain.	Relevant	here,	for	our	purposes,	is	that	these	
eleven	words	arguably	negate	the	power	of	the	creditor	to	use	the	pari	passu	clause	as	a	weapon	
because	the	“save	for	such	exceptions	as	may	be	provided	by	applicable	legislation”	modifier	that	
applies	to	the	pari	passu	clause	suggests	that	the	sovereign	debtor	can,	by	“applicable	legislation”	
change	the	pari	passu	ranking	of	the	bonds	whenever	it	wishes	to	(so	long	as	it	can	get	the	legislature	to	
pass	the	relevant	legislation).19	
	
Prior	to	September	2000,	this	change	would	probably	have	been	seen	as	meaningless.	After	all,	
in	the	pre-2001	period	the	pari	passu	clause	itself	was	largely	seen	by	the	gurus	of	the	sovereign	debt	
market	as	a	harmless	historical	artifact.20	But	in	September	2000,	a	New	York	hedge	fund,	Elliott	
Associates,	that	had	held	out	from	Peru’s	Brady	restructuring	some	time	prior,	turned	it	into	a	potent	
weapon.		And	this	bit	is	crucial	because	creditors	holding	out	in	sovereign	debt	restructurings	prior	to	
this	point	had	had	immense	difficulty	in	collecting	on	their	holdout	strategy	because	enforcing	against	
sovereigns	in	foreign	courts	was	so	difficult.		The	Elliott	v.	Peru	case	changed	that	because	Elliott	
succeeded	in	persuading	an	obscure	commercial	court	in	Brussels	that	the	pari	passu	clause	entitled	it	to	
obtain	an	injunction	against	Euroclear	(the	payment	clearing	house)	paying	out	Peru’s	other	creditors	
(the	ones	who	had	not	held	out)	unless	it,	Elliott,	was	paid	a	proportional	pro	rata	share.		That	is,	if	the	
creditors	holding	restructured	bonds	were	paid	100%	of	their	claims,	then	Elliott	was	entitled	to	be	paid	
																																																						
18	See	Offering	Circular,	Bolivarian	Republic	of	Venezuela,	US	$	1,000,000,000,	7%	Notes	Due	2018	(Nov.	26,	2003),	
at	p.11.	
	
19	Joseph	Cotterill,	Ukraine	5%	Notes	Due	2015	–	And	the	Burning	Tyres	Therein,	FT	–	Alphaville	(2016),	available	at	
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/02/19/1776612/ukraine-1984838000-5-00-per-cent-notes-due-2015-and-the-
burning-tyres-therein/	.			We	should	caution	here	though	that	this	interpretation	of	the	additional	words	“save	for	
such	exceptions	as	provided	by	applicable	legislation”	has	not	as	yet	been	tested	in	court.		
	
20	Lee	C.	Buchheit	&	Jeremiah	Pam,	The	Pari	Passu	Clause	in	Sovereign	Debt	Instruments,	51	EMORY	L.	J.	913	(2004).	
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100%	of	its	un-restructured	claim.	And	absent	equal	proportional	payment	to	each,	Elliott	claimed	(and	
the	court	agreed)	the	pari	passu	clause	was	violated.21	
	 	
The	Elliott	v.	Peru	case,	however,	was	decided	in	Brussels	(not	a	major	financial	or	legal	center),	
and	that	too	on	an	ex	parte	motion.		Lawyers	in	New	York	and	London,	the	jurisdictions	whose	laws	
under	which	the	vast	majority	of	foreign	sovereigns	issue	debt,	were	confident	that	no	judge	in	their	
jurisdictions	would	make	a	determination	in	this	fashion.22		And	so,	the	vast	majority	of	pari	passu	
clauses	remained	unchanged	in	response	to	the	Peru	case	in	September	2000.		Except	that	is,	for	a	few	
rare	exceptions,	such	as	Venezuela	where	the	lawyers	for	the	issuer	appear	to	have	quietly	put	in	a	few	
extra	words	that	potentially	defanged	the	pari	passu	weapon.23		In	December	2011,	a	full	decade	after	
the	Peru	case,	the	same	pari	passu	dispute	showed	up	before	a	federal	court	in	New	York.		And	the	
veteran	New	York	judge,	Thomas	Griesa,	contrary	to	the	predictions	of	all	those	lawyers	who	had	
heaped	contempt	on	the	Brussels	court,	basically	decided	in	the	same	way	the	Brussels	court	had.		
Indeed,	some	might	say	that	he	went	further.		Any	institution	under	his	jurisdiction	(and	given	that	it	
was	New	York,	that	basically	meant	every	major	financial	institution	in	the	world)	was	told	that	it	was	at	
risk	of	being	held	in	contempt	of	court	if	it	knowingly	assisted	Argentina	in	violating	the	pari	passu	
clause	(as	per	his	interpretation	of	it).24		Argentina,	as	a	result,	was	basically	cut	out	of	the	international	
financial	system–and	so,	in	March	2016,	it	paid;	and	paid	in	full	(and	much	more–given	interest	penalties	
and	lawyers	fees).25	
																																																						
21	For	details,	see	Buchheit	&	Pam,	supra	note	20.	
	
22	At	least,	that	was	one	of	the	primary	explanations	many	of	them	gave	when	interviewed	in	the	years	after	the	
Elliott	v.	Peru	case	(but	before	the	NML	v.	Argentina	decision	on	the	matter	in	New	York)	regarding	why	they	had	
not	changed	their	clauses	in	response	to	the	case.	See	Robert	E.	Scott	&	Mitu	Gulati,	THE	THREE	AND	A	HALF	MINUTE	
TRANSACTION:	BOILERPLATE	AND	THE	LIMITS	OF	CONTRACT	DESIGN	(University	of	Chicago	Press,	2012).	
	
23	This	new	language	actually	starts	showing	up	in	Venezuelan	bonds	as	early	at	2001,	very	soon	after	the	Elliott	v.	
Peru	decision	in	Brussels	in	late	2000.		The	2001	bonds	in	question,	however,	have	already	matured.		See	Offering	
Circular,	Bolivaran	Republic	of	Venezuela,	Euro	300,000,000,	11%	Notes	Due	2008	(March	1.	2001)	on	p.	9.		We	
should	also	note	that	although	we	earlier	attributed	the	insertion	of	the	new	pari	passu	language	in	the	2001	
bonds	to	the	issuer’s	lawyers	(since	it	advantaged	their	client,	the	issuer),	it	in	theory	could	have	been	the	two	
prominent	law	firms	working	on	the	underwriter	side	on	the	March	2001	deal	(Sullivan	&	Cromwell	(New	York	
office)	and	Linklaters	(Frankfurt	office)).	
	
24	For	details	on	how	this	worked,	see	W.	Mark	C.	Weidemaier	&	Anna	Gelpern,	Injunctions	in	Sovereign	Debt	
Litigation	31	YALE	J.	REG.	189	(2014).	
	
25	See	Robin	Wigglesworth,	When	a	Country	Defaults,	FT-Alphachat	(2016),	available	at	
http://podcast.ft.com/2016/04/27/when-a-country-defaults/		
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The	relevance	of	the	foregoing	for	our	purposes	is	that	the	ability	of	a	creditor	to	effectively	
utilize	a	holdout	strategy	depends	not	only	on	its	ability	to	hold	out	from	the	restructuring	(which	is	
determined	by	the	vote	threshold	described	earlier),	but	also	on	its	ability	to	interfere	with	the	
sovereign’s	deal	with	the	other	creditors.		As	a	historical	matter,	interfering	with	a	sovereign’s	refusal	to	
pay	some	creditors	(typically,	the	holdouts)	while	paying	the	others	(the	ones	who	agreed	to	the	
restructuring	deal)	has	been	near	impossible.	The	sovereign	after	all	has	all	sorts	of	sovereign	
immunities	in	foreign	courts	and,	even	if	those	have	been	waived,	the	sovereign	can	always	hide	its	
assets	in	its	home	jurisdiction	where	foreign	courts	cannot	reach	out	to	it.26		The	court	interpretations	of	
the	standard	pari	passu	clause	in	Brussels	in	2001	and	New	York	in	2011	changed	all	of	this	because	they	
created	a	weapon	that	could	bring	sovereigns	to	their	knees.		Even	if	foreign	courts	could	not	directly	
force	the	foreign	sovereigns	to	comply	with	their	orders,	they	could	do	so	indirectly	by	imposing	costs	
on	those	who	the	foreign	sovereigns	needed	to	do	business	with	in	their	jurisdiction—a	very	potent	
threat	in	a	financial	center	like	New	York.		But	this	strategy	was	available	only	for	those	creditors	who	
held	bonds	that	had	the	Argentine	or	Peruvian	style	pari	passu	clauses	and	whose	bonds	were	governed	
by	the	law	of	a	jurisdiction	that	was	a	global	financial	center	such	as	New	York.		
	
In	the	case	of	Venezuela,	that	type	of	clause	was	present	in	the	Venezuelan	bonds	issued	prior	
to	2003	(the	ones	with	the	100%	vote	requirement	issued	in	1997	and	1998).		Those	bonds,	therefore,	
gave	holders	both	the	ability	to	hold	out	from	any	restructuring	that	Venezuela	might	attempt	and	a	
credible	threat	of	being	able	to	use	the	New	York	court	system	to	impose	high	costs	on	Venezuela	if	it	
ever	were	to	do	a	deal	with	other	creditors	without	settling	with	the	holdouts.		The	bonds	issued	in	the	
post-2002	period,	by	contrast	had	vote	thresholds	of	85%	and	75%,	with	the	modified	or	defanged	pari	
passu	clause.		This	meant	that	these	bonds	not	only	would	have	a	lower	ability	to	hold	out	(as	compared	
to	the	100%	one;	although	the	85%	would	do	better	than	the	75%	one),	but	would	also	have	relatively	
little	power	to	use	the	highly	potent	pari	passu	weapon	against	a	non-cooperating	sovereign	debtor.27		
	
																																																																																																																																																																														
	
26	See,	e.g.,	Ugo	Panizza,	Jeromin	Zettelmeyer	&	Frederico	Sturzenegger,	The	Economics	and	Law	of	Sovereign	Debt	
and	Default,	47	J.	ECON.	LIT.	1	(2009).	
	
27	Venezuela’s	100%	vote	bonds	are	not	completely	immune	from	a	restructuring	though.		There	is	a	restructuring	
technique	called	the	Exit	Amendment	that	was	used	to	tackle	100%	vote	bonds	in	the	pre-CAC	era	in	the	New	York	
market.		See	Lee	C.	Buchheit	&	Mitu	Gulati,	Exit	Consents	in	Sovereign	Bond	Exchanges,	48	UCLA	L.	REV.	59	(2000).	
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	 To	summarize,	and	assuming	that	we	are	in	a	world	in	which	investors	are	able	to	price	small	
differences	in	contract	terms,	what	should	we	see?			The	foregoing	suggests	that	the	smart	money	
should	value	the	bonds	with	the	100%	vote	requirement	and	a	strong	pari	passu	clause	more,	and	
especially	so	as	the	crisis	worsens,	than	the	85%	and	75%	ones	with	the	defanged	pari	passu.			More	
complicated	is	the	question	of	whether	the	market	will	value	the	85%	bond	more	than	the	75%	one,	
given	that	neither	had	a	strong	pari	passu	clauses.		Whether	there	is	a	difference	will	depend	on	how	
much	the	market	values	the	ability	to	enforce	as	compared	to	the	ability	to	holdout.		If	a	holdout	
strategy	is	viewed	as	valuable	only	if	there	is	an	ability	to	enforce	combined	with	the	ability	to	holdout,	
then	we	would	expect	not	to	see	much	of	a	pricing	difference	between	the	two	types	of	bonds.		
However,	if	the	ability	to	hold	out	by	itself	is	viewed	as	having	value,	then	we	should	see	at	least	a	small	
difference	between	the	bonds,	given	that	the	85%	one	is	going	to	be,	other	things	equal,	easier	to	hold	
out	from.			
	
To	provide	a	preliminary	illustration	(before	we	get	into	the	data	analysis),	we	compare	in	Figure	
1	the	yields	of	the	9.25%	September	2027	and	the	9.25%	May	2028	bonds.		Both	bonds	have	the	same	
coupon	rate	and	maturities	are	fairly	close–less	than	8	months	apart.		Importantly,	the	former	bond	is	a	
unanimity	bond	while	the	latter	has	a	75%	vote	threshold.		As	Figure	1	shows,	the	100%	bond	trades	at	
lower	yields	throughout	–the	average	yield	differential	being	about	-88bps.		Figure	2	plots	yields	for	the	
7%	December	2018	bond	(a	85%	bond)	and	the	7.75%	October	2019–the	75%	bond	with	closest	coupon	
and	maturity	to	the	former	bond.		Here	bond	yields	are	much	closer	to	each	other,	especially	until	the	
end	of	2014,	and	the	average	yield	differential	is	19	bps.		The	overall	message	of	these	figures	is	
suggestive	that	the	strong	pari	passu	clause	embedded	in	100%	bonds	is	valuable,	while	market	
participants	treat	the	85%	and	the	75%	bonds	quite	similarly.		
	
Data	
	
Our	primary	source	of	information	is	Bloomberg,	from	where	we	select	zero	and	fixed	coupon	
USD	denominated	bonds	issued	by	Venezuela	under	New	York	law	and	outstanding	as	of	March	1,	2016.		
We	exclude	sinkable	bonds	from	our	analysis,	yielding	a	sample	of	13	bonds.		For	these	bonds	we	collect	
from	Bloomberg	daily	mid-yields,	prices	(mid,	ask	and	bid),	amount	outstanding	between	January	4,	
2010	(or	at	the	issue	date,	for	bonds	issued	later	than	January	4,	2010)	and	April	29,	2016.		We	then	
retrieve	from	bond	prospectuses	(sourced	from	the	Perfect	Information	database)	the	minimum	
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percentage	of	bondholders	required	to	change	the	payment	terms	of	an	outstanding	bond	issue.		In	our	
sample	of	Venezuelan	bonds,	this	percentage	takes	three	values:	100%	(3	bonds),	85%	(2	bonds)	and	
75%	(8	bonds).		The	cumulative	outstanding	amount	of	these	bonds	is	$23.9	billion,	thus	representing	
about	80%	of	Venezuelan	sovereign	bonds	as	of	this	writing	in	June	2016.28			
	
Our	empirical	analysis	builds	upon	previous	work	on	the	effect	of	CAC	provisions	on	bond	yields,	
using	primary	or	secondary	market	yields.29		The	dependent	variable	is	the	log	of	the	secondary	market	
mid-yield.		To	reduce	the	measurement	error	that	may	contaminate	daily	yields	we	carry	out	our	
analyses	at	the	weekly	level	and	derive	weekly	(log)	yields	as	simple	averages	of	daily	(log)	yields	in	the	
week.			
			
Our	first	empirical	specification	closely	mirrors	Bradley	&	Gulati	(2014)	who	document	a	 linear	
relation	between	bond	spreads	and	the	minimum	vote	required	to	alter	the	payment	terms.		Following	
Bradley	 and	 Gulati	 (2014)	 we	 consider	 as	 our	 primary	 explanatory	 variable	 Vote%,	 the	 minimum	
percentage	of	bondholders	required	to	change	the	payment	terms	for	bond	i.		For	a	bond	that	requires	
unanimous	approval	 from	the	creditors	for	a	change,	Vote%	 is	coded	as	1.	 	Our	empirical	strategy	 is	to	
estimate	the	following	specification:											y%,) = α + βVote% + γX%,) + θ% + ε%,)	 (1)	
where	y%,)	is	the	log	of	the	mid-yield	(in	%)	for	bond	i	during	week	t,	X%,)	is	a	vector	of	control	variables,	
and	θ%	is	a	bond-specific	time	invariant	effect.		Throughout	the	article	we	report	random-effects	(RE)	
estimation	results	for	our	specification(s),	and	cluster	standard	errors	at	the	bond	level	to	control	for	
within-bond	residual	correlation.	
	
	The	vector	X%,)	includes	variables	common	to	all	bonds,	as	well	as	bond-specific	variables	
(definitions	of	the	explanatory	variables	are	collected	in	Table	1).		Time	variant	variables	common	to	all	
bonds	include:	the	10YR	US	benchmark	yield	(Bm	yield),	in	logs)	to	account	for	general	movement	in	
																																																						
28	The	Bank	of	America	Merrill	Lynch,	Venezuela	Viewpoint	(12	February	2016)	lists,	as	of	January	2016,	sixteen	
Venezuelan	sovereign	bonds	totaling	$32,6	billion.		As	a	result	of	our	filters,	we	exclude	the	5.75%	February	2016	
bond	(as	it	matures	before	March	1,	2016)	and	two	sinkable	bonds	(12.75%	August	2022	and	11.95%	August	2031).		
The	total	outstanding	amount	of	these	sinkable	bonds	is	$7.2	billion.	
		
29	See,	e.g.,	Bradley	&	Gulati,	supra	note	5;	Alfredo	Bardozetti	&	Davide	Dottori,	Collective	Action	Clauses:	How	do	
they	Affect	Sovereign	Bond	Yields?	92	J.	INT’L	ECON.	286	(2014);	Elena	Carletti,	Paolo	Colla,	Mitu	Gulati	&	Steven	
Ongena,	The	Price	of	Law:	The	Case	of	Eurozone	Collective	Action	Clauses	(2016	draft),	available	at	
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686879.	
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sovereign	bond	yields,	the	VIX	index	as	a	proxy	for	market	volatility	(VIX),	in	logs),	and	the	spread	
between	US	corporate	AAA	and	BBB	bonds	as	a	proxy	for	the	credit	risk	premium	(BBB − AAA	Spread),	
in	logs).		We	also	construct	two	variables	that	measure	issuer	credit	risk.		First,	we	map	daily	long-term	
issuer	credit	ratings	issued	by	Fitch,	Moody’s	and	Standard	&	Poor’s	to	a	numeric	scale	ranging	from	13	
(BB-,	for	Standard	&	Poor’s)	to	18	(CCC,	for	Fitch	and	Standard	and	Poor’s,	and	Caa3	for	Moody’s).		Then	
we	create	Rating)	as	the	weekly	average	of	daily	averages	across	the	three	rating	agencies.		Higher	
values	of		Rating)	indicate	worse	credit	ratings.		Our	second	proxy	for	credit	quality	is	the	weekly	
average	of	daily	5YR	CDS	quotes	for	Venezuelan	senior	unsecured	debt	with	the	cumulative	
restructuring	clause	(CDS),	in	logs).		Figure	3	displays	the	deterioration	of	Venezuela	credit	quality	over	
time:	at	the	beginning	of	February	2015	all	three	rating	agencies	assigned	a	substantial	credit	risk	(CCC,	
or	worse)	and	5YR	CDS	spreads	rose	to	more	than	75%.		During	our	sample	period,	the	correlation	
between	the	variables	Rating)	and	CDS)	is	more	than	90%,	which	is	why	in	our	analyses	we	include	
either	(rather	than	both)	of	these	two	variables.			
	
Finally,	we	consider	bond-level	variables.		First,	we	include	residual	maturity,	given	by	the	
difference	between	a	bond	maturity	and	week	t	(Resid	Mat%,),	in	log-weeks).		The	greater	the	maturity	
of	a	bond,	the	more	likely	it	is	that	borrower	creditworthiness	will	change	during	the	life	of	the	bond.		
Thus,	residual	maturity	proxies	for	the	degree	of	uncertainty	about	repayment.		Second,	we	include	the	
coupon	rate	(Coupon%,	in	percentage)	since	there	is	sometimes	a	tax	related	preference	for	higher	
coupon	bonds.		Third,	we	use	the	bid-ask	spread	(BA	Spread%,),	in	percentage)	as	a	proxy	for	bond	
liquidity.30Descriptive	statistics	for	our	control	variables	are	provided	in	Table	2.		
	
Regression	results	for	specification	(1)	are	reported	in	Table	3.		The	US-based	macro	variables	
are	significant	and	with	the	expected	sign:	Venezuelan	bond	yields	are	positively	affected	by	the	general	
level	of	sovereign	yields,	the	market	volatility	and	the	credit	risk	premium.		Yields	are	also	inversely	
related	to	the	issuer	creditworthiness.		According	to	Table	3,	a	one	notch	deterioration	in	average	credit	
																																																						
30	The	majority	of	existing	studies	employ	primary	market	data	and	thus	measure	bond-level	liquidity	with	the	
issue	size.	Similarly,	we	could	use	a	bond’s	outstanding	amount	here.		However,	this	variable	turns	out	to	be	time-
invariant	(at	the	individual	bond	level)	in	our	sample	of	bonds.		We	therefore	choose	to	resort	to	the	bid-ask	
spread	which	shows	both	cross-sectional	and	time-series	variation	and	thus	we	believe	can	provide	more	timely	
signals	of	bond-specific	liquidity.		
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ratings	increase	yields	by	22.5%	(=1-exp(-0.255)).31		Since,	according	to	Table	2,	bond	yields	are,	on	
average,	15.44%	(=exp(2.737)),	our	coefficient	on	Rating)	translates	a	one-notch	deterioration	into	a	
347bps	increase	in	yields.		Table	3	further	shows	that	a	10%	increase	in	sovereign	CDS	spreads	leads	to	a	
70bps	decrease	in	yields.		
	
Turning	to	bond-level	variables,	we	uncover	a	negative	association	between	residual	maturity	
and	yields.		Although	this	may	at	first	be	surprising,	it	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	for	issuers	with	
poor	credit	quality,	the	passage	of	time	can	offer	an	improvement	in	their	creditworthiness	(in	colloquial	
terms,	the	yield	curve	flips).32	Coupon	rate	and	the	bid-ask	spread	do	not	appear	to	affect	bond	yields.		
Moreover,	yields	are	not	affected	by	our	variable	of	interest,	Vote.33		
	
An	explanation	behind	the	lack	of	significance	of	Vote	is	that	the	relation	between	the	minimum	
percentage	of	bondholders	required	to	change	the	payment	terms	and	(log-)yields	is	non-linear.		Put	
differently,	remember	that	the	bonds	with	a	100%	vote	contained	a	potent	pari	passu	clause,	whereas	
the	bonds	with	the	75%	and	85%	voted	contained	a	defanged	one.	That	should,	if	investors	were	paying	
attention	to	the	legalese,	mean	a	significantly	different	pricing	relationship	between	the	100%	and	85%	
bonds	and	the	85%	and	75%	bonds.			
	
																																																						
31	This	result	is	consistent	with	Cantor	&	Packer	(1996)	that,	using	secondary	market	spreads	on	35	sovereign	
bonds,	estimate	the	effect	of	a	one-notch	downgrade	to	be	a	25%	increase	in	spreads.	Similarly,	Kamin	&	von	Kleist	
(1999),	using	primary	market	spreads	on	about	300	sovereign	bonds,	estimate	an	increase	by	26%	following	a	one-
notch	downgrade	in	the	speculative	grade	range.	See	Richard	Cantor	&	Frank	Packer,	Determinants	and	Impact	of	
Sovereign	Credit	Ratings,	FRB(NY)	ECON.	POL’Y	REV.	(October)	37	(1996);	Steven	B.	Kamin	&	Karsten	von	Kleist,	The	
Evolution	and	Determinants	of	Emerging	Market	Credit	Spreads	in	the	1990s,	BIS	Working	Paper	68	(1999).	
	
32	See,	for	example,	the	discussion	in	Stephen	J.	Choi,	Eric	A.	Posner	&	Mitu	Gulati,	Pricing	Terms	in	Sovereign	Debt	
Contracts:	A	Greek	Case	Study,	6	CAP.	MKTS.	L.	J.	163	(2011).		Along	these	lines,	Fons	(1994)	documents	that	spreads	
on	lower-rated	US	corporate	issuers	narrow	with	maturity,	while	those	of	higher-rated	firms	widen.		Similarly,	
Kamin	&	von	Kleist	(1999)	report	a	diminished	responsiveness	of	sovereign	spreads	to	maturity	as	credit	ratings	
deteriorate.		See	Jerome	S.	Fons,	Using	Default	Rates	to	Model	the	Term	Structure	of	Credit	Risk,	50	FIN.	ANAL.	J.	25	
(1994);	Kamin	&	von	Kleist,	supra	note	32.			
	
33	At	a	first	glance	this	result	is	inconsistent	with	Bradley	&	Gulati	(2014)	(supra	note	5)	that	reports	a	statistically	
significant	2bps	increase	in	spreads	on	bonds	written	under	New	York	law	due	to	a	1%	increase	in	the	minimum	
percentage	of	bondholders	required	to	change	the	payment	terms	(see	Table	IX	in	Bradley	&	Gulati	2014).		We	
note	however	that	the	estimated	coefficient	on	Vote	is	not	statistically	different	from	zero	in	Bradley	&	Gulati	
(2014)	as	well	for	non-investment	grade	issuers	once	the	authors	control	for	the	state	of	the	world	economy	(see	
Table	X).		Therefore,	as	Venezuela	is	a	non-investment	grade	issuer	during	our	sample	period,	our	findings	are	
indeed	consistent	with	those	in	Bradley	&	Gulati	(2014)	to	the	extent	that	our	variables	Bm	yield,	VIX	and	BBB −AAA	Spread	track	the	state	of	the	world	economy	reasonably	well.	
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To	investigate	the	foregoing,	we	estimate	the	following	specification:											y%,) = α + βFVote	85% + βIVote	100% + γX%,) + θ% + ε%,)	 (2)	
where	Vote	85%	(resp.	Vote	100%)	equals	one	for	a	bond	with	Vote% = 0.85	(resp.	Vote% = 1)	
and	zero	otherwise.		Note	that,	by	means	of	Vote	85%	and	Vote	100%	we	are	now	coding	the	minimum	
vote	threshold	differently	from	what	we	previously	did	with	the	variable	Vote%.		This	bears	on	the	
interpretation	of	the	βs	across	our	regressions:	while	β	in	specification	(1)	corresponds	to	the	change	in	
(log-)yields	associated	with	a	1%	change	in	the	minimum	vote	threshold,	βF	and	βI	in	specification	(2)	
encapsulate	the	differential	yield	on	a	85%	and	a	unanimity	bond,	respectively,	relative	to	a	bond	with	a	
75%	vote	requirement	(baseline).		Columns	3	and	4	in	Table	3	report	regression	results	for	this	
specification,	and	show	that,	while	βF	is	insignificant,	βI	is	negative	and	significant.		It	therefore	appears	
that,	while	markets	do	not	price	differently	a	75%	and	a	85%	bond,	they	do	differentiate	between	the	
unanimity	bond	(with	the	strong	pari	passu)	and	the	two	bonds	with	the	lower	vote	requirement	(and	
weaker	pari	passu	clauses).	
	
Our	estimates	indicate	that	yields	on	a	unanimity	bond	are	8.7%	to	10.86%	lower	than	yields	on	
a	75%	bond.		Since	the	average	yield	on	75%	bonds	in	our	sample	is	15.25%,	the	unanimity	rule	is	
associated	with	a	133bps	to	166bps	yield	reduction.		To	put	these	numbers	into	perspective,	the	
interquartile	range	of	yields	on	75%	bonds	is	527bps	so	that	the	average	yield	reduction	we	document	
for	unanimity	bonds	corresponds	to	25%-30%	of	the	distribution	of	75%	bonds.	One	can	read	this	
evidence	as	suggesting	two	possibilities.	
	
First,	putting	aside	the	pari	passu	clause,	the	foregoing	might	be	saying	that	there	is	a	
substantial	pricing	premium	for	bonds	that	face	a	higher	risk	of	holdout	problems,	but	only	for	those	
bonds	where	this	risk	is	highest.		It	is	possible	that	the	market	puts	a	huge	value	on	the	unanimity	vote	
requirement	where	there	is	a	zero	possibility	of	a	cram	down	by	a	super	majority	of	creditors.		That	is	a	
possibility,	but	it	is	somewhat	puzzling	why	the	market	would	not	attach	at	least	some	pricing	premium	
to	a	10%	difference	in	a	vote	threshold	(between	85%	and	75%)	when	it	seems	to	attach	an	enormous	
difference	to	a	15%	premium	(between	100%	and	85%).		That	then	takes	us	to	the	second,	and	we	think	
more	plausible,	possibility,	which	is	that	the	market	is	not	only	concerned	about	differences	in	the	vote	
thresholds	but	also	the	strength	of	the	pari	passu	clause.		To	take	this	back	to	the	question	that	we	
began	the	article	with:		We	are	finding	evidence	that	the	market,	in	a	near-default	situation,	is	able	to	
Draft:	June	10,	2016	–	Forthcoming,	Capital	Markets	Law	Journal	(2016)	
parse	small	differences	in	the	legalese.34		At	least,	more	so	than	prior	research	has	discerned.		The	
caveat	is	that	we	only	have	a	handful	of	bonds,	and	only	bonds	for	one	sovereign.	
	
Conclusion	
Our	finding	is	that	in	a	near-default	scenario	the	markets	do	seem	to	be	able	to	discern	the	
difference	between	bonds	that	allow	for	a	greater	ability	to	hold	out	and	the	others.		Prior	research,	in	
particular	in	the	context	of	the	Greek	restructuring	of	2012	had	found	evidence	consistent	with	what	we	
report	here.		But	that	research	was	looking	at	highly	salient	contract	features,	such	as	whether	the	
bonds	were	governed	by	local	(Greek)	law	or	foreign	(English)	law.		Here,	we	drill	deeper	and	look	at	
whether	the	markets	can	discern	smaller	(albeit	potentially	significant)	differences	in	the	fine	print	
legalese	in	the	bonds.		And	we	find,	in	the	case	of	Venezuelan	sovereign	bonds	in	2016,	evidence	
consistent	with	the	premise	that	markets	are	able	to	discern	these	differences.	
					
There	remains	a	puzzle	though,	which	is	that	our	finding	contrasts	with	the	existing	literature	on	
CAC	provisions	that	has	largely	found	either	no	pricing	difference	or	a	pricing	premium	for	bonds	with	
lower	vote	thresholds	(the	latter	being	the	the	opposite	of	what	we	find).35	The	explanation	for	this	
difference	in	findings	may	be	that	most	of	research	on	the	pricing	of	CAC	provisions	looks	at	countries	
that	are	doing	reasonably	well	economically.		The	investors	in	those	cases	are	primarily,	we	suspect,	
large	institutions	or	unsophisticated	retail	investors—their	reason	for	investing	in	government	bonds	is	
that	they	are	generally	safe	investments.		In	a	near-default	scenario	though,	those	types	of	investors	
tend	to	exit	and	are	replaced	by	the	wolves	of	the	market—sophisticated	hedge	funds,	many	of	whom	
have	lawyers	who	carefully	parse	contracts	seeking	an	advantage	for	their	investors.36			As	noted	above,	
																																																						
34	One	potential	concern	with	our	interpretation	relates	to	the	relative	size	of	bonds	with	different	voting	
thresholds.		For	instance,	if	unanimity	bonds	represented	a	large	fraction	of	the	debt	stock,	it	might	be	unlikely	
that	they	get	repaid	in	full	regardless	of	their	voting	thresholds.		The	three	100%	bonds	in	our	sample	total	$5	
billion,	which	is	about	16%	of	the	Venezuelan	debt	stock	as	of	June	2016--probably	not	too	large	a	fraction.			
Similarly,	it	might	be	easier	to	hold	out	in	a	75%	bond	that	is	small	than	in	an	85%	bond	that	is	large.		However,	
bond	size	is	fairly	similar	across	these	two	groups	of	bonds:	75%	bonds	range	between	$1.25	billion	and	$3	billion,	
while	the	two	85%	bonds	have	size	$1	billion	and	$1.5	billion,	respectively.		
	
35	E.g.,	Haseler,	supra	note	7	(reviewing	the	literature);	see	also	Carletti	et	al.,	supra	note	30;	Bradley	&	Gulati,	
supra	note	5.		An	exception	here	is	Barry	Eichengreen	&	Ashoka	Mody,	Do	Collective	Action	Clauses	Raise	
Borrowing	Costs?	114	ECON.	J.	247	(2004).	
	
36	These	funds	are	often	described	as	engaging	in	“legal	arbitrage”	or	“contract	arbitrage”	strategies.		See	Stephen	
J.	Choi,	Robert	E.	Scott	&	Mitu	Gulati,	Contractual	Arbitrage,	Oxford	Handbook	of	Global	Governance	(Eric	
Brousseau	et	al.	eds.,	forthcoming	2017).	
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when	we	compare	our	results	to	the	research	that	focuses	on	bonds	in	near-default	scenarios,	they	are	
largely	consistent	with	them.37			What	we	document	is	also	consistent	with	the	idea	that	market	
participants	(or	at	least	some	of	them)	have	learned	from	the	lengthy	legal	fight	between	Argentina	and	
holdout	investors	that	the	absence	of	collective	action	clauses	can	be	exploited	to	block	a	sovereign	
restructuring	and	obtain	full	repayment.			
	
																																																																																																																																																																														
	
37	E.g.,	Choi	et	al.,	supra	note	12;	Choi	&	Gulati,	supra	note	1;	Chamon	et	al.,	supra	note	1;	Andrew	Clare	&	Nicolas	
Schmidlin,	The	Impact	of	Foreign	Governing	Law	on	European	Government	Bond	Yields	(2014	draft),	available	at	
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2406477		
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Table	1.	Definition	of	variables.	This	table	provides	a	detailed	description	of	our	variables.	All	variables	are	weekly	averages	of	daily	values,	with	
the	exception	of	Coupon	and	Vote	that	are	time-invariant	bond-level	variables.	
	
	
Variable	 Description	 Units/Scale	 Source	
Vote	 Minimum	 percentage	 of	 bondholders	 required	 to	 change	 the	 payment	
terms.	100%	is	coded	as	Vote=1	
Decimals	 Perfect	Info	
Vote	85	 =1	if	Vote=0.85,	=0	otherwise	 Binary	 Perfect	Info	
Vote	100	 =1	if	Vote=1,	=0	otherwise	 Binary	 Perfect	Info	
Bm	yield	 US	government	benchmark	yield	10YR		 %	(log)	 Datastream	
VIX	 VIX	Index,	settlement	price	 %	(log)	 Datastream	
BBB-AAA	Spread	 Yield	spread	between	BofA	Merrill	Lynch	US	corporate	AAA	and	BBB		 bps	(log)	 Datastream	
Rating	 Average	of	foreign	currency	LT	debt	issuer	rating	given	by	Fitch,	Moody’s	
and	S&P	
13	(BB-)	to	18	(CCC)	 Bloomberg	
CDS	 5YR	CDS	spread,	senior	unsecured	debt	with	CR	clause			 %	(log)	 Markit	
Resid	Mat	 Distance	to	maturity	 Months	(log)	 Bloomberg	
Coupon	 Annual	coupon	 %	 Bloomberg	
BA	Spread	 Percentage	bid-ask	spread	(PASK-PBID)/PMID	 %	 Bloomberg	
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Table	2.	Descriptive	statistics.	This	table	presents	means,	medians,	5th	and	95th	percentiles	for	our	sample	
of	Venezuelan	bonds.	The	sample	period	 ranges	between	4	 January	2010	and	29	April	2016.	Variables	 in	
Panel	A	are	time-variant	bond-invariant.	Variables	in	Panel	B	are	time-	and	bond-variant	with	the	exception	
of	Vote	and	Coupon,	which	are	time-invariant.	
	
	
Panel	A:	bond-invariant	variables	
Variable	(unit)	 Mean	 Median	 5th	Perc.	 95th	Perc.	 N.	Obs.	
Bm	yield	(%,	log)	 0.858	 0.831	 0.496	 1.288	 330	
VIX	(%,	log)	 3.016	 2.978	 2.730	 3.449	 330	
BBB-AAA	Spread	(bps,	log)	 5.000	 5.056	 4.576	 5.397	 330	
Rating	(index)	 15.321	 14.333	 14	(B+)	 18	(CCC)	 330	
CDS	(%,	log)	 2.680	 2.347	 1.942	 4.157	 330	
Panel	B:	bond-level	variables	
Variable	(unit)	 Mean	 Median	 5th	Perc.	 95th	Perc.	 N.	Obs.	
Yield	(%,	log)	 2.737	 2.624	 2.247	 3.579	 4,188	
Vote		 0.823	 0.75	 0.75	 1	 13	
Resid	Mat	(months,	log)	 4.821	 4.889	 3.799	 5.687	 4,188	
Coupon	(%)	 9.194	 9.0	 6.0	 13.625	 13	
BA	Spread	(%)	 1.177	 0.840	 0.000	 4.221	 4,188	
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Table	 3.	 Minimum	 vote	 thresholds	 and	 yield	 differentials.	 This	 table	 presents	 random	 (bond-level)	
effects	 regression	 results	 to	 examine	 the	 relation	 between	 the	minimum	 percentage	 of	 bondholders	
required	to	change	the	payment	terms	CAC	provisions	and	bond	yields.	The	sample	ranges	from	January	
4,	2010	to	April	29,	2016	and	includes	13	Venezuelan	bonds.	The	dependent	variable	is	weekly	log-yield.	
Definitions	 of	 the	 explanatory	 variables	 are	 provided	 in	 Table	 1.	 Standard	 errors	 are	 clustered	 at	 the	
bond	level.	***,	**,	and	*	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	1%,	5%,	and	10%	level,	respectively.	
	
	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 	 	 	 	
Vote	 -0.685	 -0.778	 	 	
	 (0.529)	 (0.602)	 	 	
Vote	85	 	 	 0.011	 0.006	
	 	 	 (0.024)	 (0.044)	
Vote	100	 	 	 -0.091**	 -0.115*	
	 	 	 (0.046)	 (0.069)	
Bm	yield	 0.468***	 0.241***	 0.425***	 0.172***	
	 (0.027)	 (0.019)	 (0.021)	 (0.011)	
VIX	 0.481***	 0.214***	 0.433***	 0.146***	
	 (0.027)	 (0.029)	 (0.022)	 (0.023)	
BBB-AAA	Spread	 0.389***	 0.174***	 0.378***	 0.135***	
	 (0.039)	 (0.031)	 (0.039)	 (0.030)	
Rating	 0.256***	 	 0.279***	 	
	 (0.012)	 	 (0.016)	 	
CDS	 	 0.452***	 	 0.491***	
	 	 (0.022)	 	 (0.026)	
Resid	Mat	 -0.378***	 -0.422***	 -0.146***	 -0.186***	
	 (0.044)	 (0.055)	 (0.016)	 (0.019)	
Coupon	 0.009	 0.009	 0.016**	 0.016*	
	 (0.020)	 (0.024)	 (0.006)	 (0.009)	
Bid-Ask	Spread	 0.008	 0.008*	 0.010	 0.010	
	 (0.007)	 (0.004)	 (0.010)	 (0.006)	
	 	 	 	 	
Obs	 4,188	 4,188	 4,188	 4,188	
R-overall	 0.818	 0.848	 0.892	 0.944	
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Figure	1.	100%	vs	75%	vote	threshold.	Weekly	time	series	of	average	yields	 for	 the	9.25%	September	
2027	(ISIN	US922646AS37)	and	the	9.25%	May	2028	(ISIN	USP17625AB33)	bonds	(top	panel)	and	yield	
differential	between	the	two	bonds	(bottom	panel).	The	dashed	line	in	the	bottom	panel	 indicates	the	
average	yield	differential	(-88	bps).	
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Figure	2.	85%	vs	75%	vote	threshold.	Weekly	time	series	of	average	yields	for	the	7%	December	2018	
(ISIN	USP97475AD26)	 and	 the	7.75%	October	2019	 (ISIN	USP97475AN08)	 bonds	 (top	panel)	 and	yield	
differential	between	the	two	bonds	(bottom	panel).	The	dashed	line	in	the	bottom	panel	 indicates	the	
average	yield	differential	(19	bps).		
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Figure	 3.	 Venezuela	 credit	 quality.	Weekly	 time	 series	 of	 average	 rating	 across	 Fitch,	 Moody’s	 and	
Standard	&	Poor’s	(Rating,	left	axis)	and	5YR	CDS	spreads	(log	%,	right	axis).	
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